On Theology and Public Policy

On Theology and Public Policy

‘I'm completely in favor of the separation of Church and State. My idea is that these two institutions screw us up enough on their own, so both of them together is certain death.’ George Carlin

In recent years, and especially after the events of September 11, 2001, awareness of the role of religious identity and religion in general in politics and public policy has grown expansively.We have come a long way since Pierre Trudeau famously declared the irrelevance of God to the state: ‘I don't think God gives a damn whether he's in the constitution or not’ (Liberal Caucus, 1981).

In the pre-9/11 world, religious identity when it came to the attention of policy makers in the Canadian context usually was subsumed under the heading of the ‘Canadian diversity model’. Here, religious communities were exemplars and to some extent first line deliverers of the multicultural vision of Canada. In general, however, the specifically religious claims of religious communities were a matter of formal political indifference. At best, a religious community might be seen as an electoral voting bloc, but little more; consequently, while its interests might occasionally come to the fore, they could also be expected to retreat as soon as possible once ‘accommodated’. (Biles and Ibrahim 2005).

Religious identity was welcome, then, but mostly in a form explicitly or implicitly compatible with civil religion. Historically, however, civil religion of the sort the pre-9/11 world approved had its roots in the Judeo-Christian egress of modernity writ large. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that much policy followed a general Judeo-Christian trajectory.The two oppositions, ‘church’ and ‘state’, rarely clashed, for one grew out of the other and the two were largely happy with the arrangement.

The situation today, however, may be rather different. After 9/11, religion and its claims have been very much on the minds of policy makers, for clear reasons relating to the sheer fact of violence and the need to find some prospect of peace. In a multicultural and globalized culture, furthermore, the hegemony of a tacitly Judeo-Christian ethos in civil religion and in political craft has also been eroded. The flashpoints are Islam itself, or more specifically certain varieties of Islam, on the one hand, and Islamophobia in the post 9/11 western world on the other.

Add to this the crises of HIV-AIDS and the threat of global warming, and the question arises: have we here reasons for a ‘paradigm shift’ in the relation between politics and religion? Amid the trifecta of globalization, humanitarian crises and environmental issues, for instance, FBOs (among other non-governmental organizations) have responded not only by heightening awareness of the need for altruistic action as a moral demand placed on individuals, but also by emphasizing the need for a shift of principle among policy makers — in relation, for example, to third world debt (Wuthnow and Lewis 2008).

Grassroots political consciousness among those involved in organic religious communities is thus more important today for policy makers than it has been for some time.The famously infamous American Senator Jesse Helms argued against enacting foreign aid in the 1990s, citing that the (religiously conservative) American public saw much of the world as a ‘foreign rat hole’; perversely, however, even this dictum demonstrates how imperative it is not only to the ‘hearts and minds’ of voters (Kiely 2001), but to take account of how those hearts and minds have been shaped, for good or ill. In Canada today, expressions of those hearts and minds are often found in advocacy groups and new humanitarian FBOs.As any change in public policy is more likely to be proposed, passed into law, and prove successful if it captures the public mood, and as religion is very definitely part and parcel of the mood of the day then it follows that policy-makers need to (and do) pay heed to religion. As study after study demonstrates, religiously-minded folk tend to be more politically active, in terms of making it to the ballot box if not also in philanthropy (Greenville 2000).

This, then, seems to be good news for religiously minded people: the iron-curtain between ‘church’ and ‘state’ seems to have fallen; the possibility of their voices being heard by policy makers raises hopes and indeed is making an impact. A proliferation of religiously motivated advocacy groups has grown in capitals throughout the Western world, lobbying in the public sphere not only behind closed doors, but in the open media where they hope to marshal public awareness.

But is it really good news that religion is newly on the mind of those in public and civil roles?

In an important essay published in 2008, Princeton sociologist Robert Wuthnow raises a flag in the jubilant atmosphere of the revival of religious consciousness in the public sphere — and it is this flag precisely that is the reason for this research centre.The issue with both such ‘grassroots’ movements and their reception by policy makers is that religious identity is often confused or reduced to tropes on both sides of the conversation.Clouding the picture is the fact that academics, when they come to study religion, typically use tools that are inadequate in that they make the sort of same category mistake.The mistake, in short, is to suppose that religious people are ‘simply ambient spaces or subcultures’, and to fail to grasp that they ‘actually do things’ and thus think things as well (Wuthnow and Lewis 2008, 194). In other words, what policy types fail to recognize is that religious identities are not merely static or monolithic and therefore capable of being neatly parsed (and ‘accommodated’), but rather that religious communities are formed by their commitments to a much wider theological vision, and that this is what it is important to understand. What matters is not merely the outcomes, positions or slogans of the group at a given moment. Rather, theology, as the articulation of community faith, practice and vision, is what really ‘matters,’ and in fact matters so much that it can hedge against the worst kind of abuses that the iron curtain between ‘church’ and ‘state’ tried to ameliorate.

For the sociologist, and this is largely Wuthnow’s concern, it is not enough to gauge religiosity in terms of attendance or general belief, but one needs to pay attention to the specific intellectual content learnt in congregational catechism.What religious groups ‘do’ is a reflection of deeply held theological commitments, and yes, sometimes these are hijacked by cultural agendas or confused, but as Wuthnow intimates, there can be depth of tradition even in interpretation within a group. It is not enough to chart belief or attendance; we need to help distinguish what makes that belief or attendance something meaningful for the religious adherent.

For the policy maker, it is important to grasp that religious communities have within themselves tremendous ‘divine divides’, and that to ignore those differences lie, whether Protestant to Catholic, Protestant to Protestant, or inter-faith, is to invite misfire. In the first instance, however, consideration of the theoretical terms of why or how religion matters is surely a matter for theology, speaking for itself, and of allowing religious communities to think, debate, and speak for themselves.

For religious people and FBOs, the implication is that if it truly matters that they sit at the table of cultural dialogue (and I think it does by and large for religious persons), then it is imperative that their ‘God-talk’ is translated in such a manner that understanding or intelligence is given adequate opportunity. Advocacy, then, cannot short-circuit the ‘why’ of the issues; it must also bridge and articulate divides, if only to bring understanding to its own ‘house’ as all identities are fluid constructs. Perhaps what was once thought absolutely critical, on intelligence, may pale. For its part, Christian history is replete with such culturally imposed abuses, and subsequent corrections, running from slavery to women’s rights.

For NGOs, in a society of ribbon-awareness, encouraging ready-made and short-term‘slacktivism’, it seems imperative that the reason for changing our behaviors extend beyond simply a tug of the heart-string.To continue the above metaphor of ‘hearts and minds’, the ‘mind’ is important to reach, and attitudes must be deeply engrained and articulated if the heart is to remain true. That articulation is a question of theological vision and it cannot be mute but must speak in the open market where transformative values are coined.Otherwise, what we advocate today may tomorrow be replaced by another color in our ribbon rainbow.

I think Wuthnow is correct in that we stand at a cross-roads in our Western history and can never return to halcyon days. Religion ‘matters’ today, but the trick, and our hope, is to allow theological accounts to speak clearly, hear well, and as a result create intelligence on behalf of all at the table.

Darren Marks

Director, Centre for Public Theology

References:

John Biles and Humera Ibrahim (2005), ‘Religion and Public Policy: Immigration, Citizenship and Multiculturalism – Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner?’ in Paul Bramadat and David Seljak (eds), Religionand Ethnicity in Canada (Pearson-Longman: Toronto) pp 154-77.

Andrew S Grenville (2000), ‘For by Him All Things Were Created . . . Visible and Invisible: Sketching the Contours of Public and Private Religion in North America’ in David Lyon and Marguerite Van Die (eds), Rethinking Church, State and Modernity, (University of Toronto Press: Toronto) pp 211-27.

Kathy Kiely (2001), ‘Importance of Foreign Aid is Hitting Home’ USA Today Dec 3 edition (Online).

Robert Wuthnow and Valerie Lewis (2008), ‘Religion and Altruistic US Foreign Policy: Evidence from a National Survey of Church Members’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion47(2):191-209.